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PERFORMANCE ANXIETY:
COPYRIGHT EMBODIED AND DISEMBODIED
by REBECCA TUSHNET*
The primary economic and cultural significance of copyright today
comes from works and rights that weren’t contemplated by the Framers of
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause.   Some, like videogames, were barely
considered by the drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act, and new means of
distribution have profoundly changed the scope and meaning of copyright
even for entrenched genres.1   Performance — both as protected work and
as right — is where much of copyright’s expansion has had its greatest
impact, as new technologies have made it possible to fix performances in
records and films and as cultural change has propelled recorded music and
audiovisual works to the forefront of the copyright industries.2
Performance is now the prototype for all works.   For one thing, the
expansion of copyright beyond exact copying to substantial similarity and
derivative works means that the actual scope of a copyright encompasses a
practically infinite set of potential variations.  This mimics the standard
condition of any play or score, which carries with it a practically infinite set
of potential performances, all of which will be understandably perform-
ances of the underlying work.  Yet copyright has never fully conceptual-
ized performance, and this has led to persistent confusion about what
copyright protects.
Tensions and inadequacies in copyright’s treatment of non-text ele-
ments of a work such as performance have been largely ignored for two
reasons beyond copyright’s traditional focus on text.  First, the major cop-
yright challenge of the digital age involves pure reproductions. When we
are talking about massive sharing of digital files, collections of ones and
zeros, it matters much less what type of work ultimately is reproduced.
Second, copyright has been much more interested in “performance rights”
than “performances,” and debate has focused on issues such as what con-
*Thanks to Rob Kasunic and participants at the Chicago Faculty Workshop and
the Chicago-Kent Faculty Workshop for helpful comments.
1 Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 3 UTAH L.
REV. 551 (2007).
2 Software, which for historical reasons is considered a literary work, is also
hugely valuable, but my focus here is on works sequentially experienced by
users — whether that happens through reading (books), watching (film and
television), listening (music/sound recordings), or playing (videogames).
While software is a literary work, a videogame is also an audiovisual work.
See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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stitutes a “public” performance instead of a “private” one and whether
restaurants should have to pay when they turn the radio on.  These are
issues that tend to be resolved by interest group influence and bargaining.
Conceptually, legal discussions tend to offer a dual model of the per-
formance as work.  In one view, it’s protected because of its technical
characteristics: the things that make it a material object, such as the fact
that the camera or microphone operator chose a particular angle and the
editor cut the film at a particular point or the sound engineer chose a
particular level.  In another, it’s protected because of its content: the crea-
tive actions of the performers being recorded.  Courts and advocates tend
to switch back and forth between these as needed.  This dual nature allows
courts to finesse awkward questions about the relationship between au-
thorship, creativity, and copyright’s incentives.
One key problem of performance from copyright’s perspective is thus
how to identify the creative elements that make a work of performance
original and protectable, as distinguished from elements that make it a
work (a fixed artifact).3  A major variant of this question involves author-
ship: who is sufficiently responsible for a work of performance to be
deemed its author, and thus its default owner?  In a world where works
require dozens and even hundreds of people to complete them, this ques-
tion will often be difficult to answer while both respecting creativity and
recognizing economic imperatives.  While contracts will often take care of
authorship issues for well-represented commissioning parties, there will in-
evitably be gaps that require identification of who counts as an author; in
addition, third parties such as fair users and intermediaries have separate
interests in knowing who owns a work, and contracts don’t address the
3 Nimmer considers motion pictures “distinctive” among the categories of copy-
rightable works “in that their continuous sight and sound can provide the
requisite fixation to almost any human activity,” “everything from an ath-
letic event to a surgical procedure, from a Thanksgiving day parade to the
steps executed in operating a nuclear power plant.”  1 MELVILLE B. NIM-
MER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09[F] (2013) (footnote
omitted).  One interesting thing about this statement is that motion pictures
really aren’t distinctive in that sense: words can also fix descriptions of these
things — and yet it does not seem to be a difficult concept that protecting
copyright in the words doesn’t give any copyright in the activities described.
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).  Somehow, the immediacy or ap-
parent realism of the moving image seems to create more difficult questions
about what’s protected, though it’s still possible to undertake a separate
analysis of whether the activity captured on film is itself a work of author-
ship. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 2.09[F] (“The focus of this inquiry
necessarily divides the creative aspects of the motion picture from the crea-
tive aspects of the underlying subject matter portrayed therein.”) (footnote
omitted).
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problems they face when performers make authorship claims. An underly-
ing theory of authorship is necessary.
Another set of questions involves whether there are ways to recognize
performers’ creative contributions without contributing to copyright’s
bloat, and how to assess claims of infringement in a performance context
when the alleged copying isn’t exact.  This article addresses these puzzles
of performance, arguing that manageability rather than creativity is gener-
ally the basis for the rights allocations and distinctions copyright law
makes.  The recent controversy over the film Innocence of Muslims, along
with other instances in which subjects of audiovisual works claimed copy-
right in those works, demonstrate the limited role played by creativity in
copyright law. That’s not necessarily illegitimate, but we should be more
honest about why, even outside the work for hire context, we seem to
require more of performers than of other author-claimants.
I. PERFORMANCE AS WORK: FLUIDITY AND FIXATION
Performance is not itself a category of protected works in U.S. law.
Rather, certain performances are protected.  A performance of a musical
work, for example, can be fixed in a sound recording.4  A performance of
a play, known as a “dramatic” work, can be fixed in an audiovisual record-
ing.  Choreography for dance can be fixed and protected if it is notated or
if a performance is recorded on video.5  Movies and other audiovisual
works are also protected, raising the possibility of protecting a film as a
film and separately protecting the dramatic work recorded in that film
(thus, for example, a film of the same performance taken from a different
camera angle might infringe the performance but not the film), or of deny-
ing separate protection to the work depicted.6  By contrast, plays and
scripts are literary works, not works of performance, even though they are
intended to be performed.
In defining what it will protect, copyright helps produce what we con-
sider valuable in art.7  Copyright law has often ignored the fluidity of crea-
tivity, especially when it comes to works that are performed.  This
tendency has only been reinforced by the traditional artistic hierarchies
that elevate writers over performers, and look down even on written
4 A work consisting of recorded sound is still a sound recording if it’s just a
recording of nature, with no performance by human beings involved. See
H.R. REP. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570.
5 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162-63 (2d.
Cir. 1986).
6 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.09[F].
7 See Anne Barron, The Legal Properties of Film, 67 MOD. L. REV. 177 (2004).
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works to the extent they are part of genres such as science fiction and
romance that are associated with visuals, embodiment, and high emotion.8
Both in creation and in execution, performance is less fixed and pre-
dictable than copyright’s categories generally accept.9  For example, plays
tend to emerge through interaction with performers rather than just from
a playwright’s head.10  The dependence of playwrights and others who
write for performance on performers has generally not been recognized
8 Francesca Coppa, Writing Bodies in Space: Media Fan Fiction as Theatrical
Performance, in FAN FICTION AND FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE
INTERNET: NEW ESSAYS 225, 231 (Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse eds.,
2006) (“[T]raditional values . . . privilege the written word over the spoken
one and mind over body.  The move down the hierarchy therefore repre-
sents a shift from literary values (the mind, the word, the ‘original state-
ment’) to what I would claim are theatrical ones (repetition, performance,
embodied action).”); see also id. at 228 (noting that, even within relatively
low status literary genres such as science fiction, the literary establishment
has looked down on performance genres, including film); cf. Don Cusic, In
Defense of Cover Songs: Commerce and Credibility 223, 224, in PLAY IT
AGAIN, COVER SONGS IN POPULAR MUSIC (George Plasketes ed., 2010)
[hereinafter PLAY IT AGAIN] (in music, critics and fans tend to prefer
singer-songwriters, ignoring the value of interpretation).
9 There are performance-like written works and writing-like performances.  It’s
not my project to argue that there are clean dividing lines, but rather to
suggest that the prototype of the written text has had negative effects on
modern copyright law (in much the same way one might suggest that the
prototype of “mother” has had negative effects on mothers whose identities
don’t fit the prototype). See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DAN-
GEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 37 (1987).
10 As Brent Salater writes:
Theatre is inherently collaborative because it is an amalgam of the
“static” word as it appears in the text and the “dynamic” act as it appears
on the stage. There is an inseparability of the textual and the theatrical
production. The process does not carefully insulate the writing of scripts
from the acting or actual production of plays. It is not until this final step
of “performance” is realised that the play can be said to be complete.
Brent Salter, Taming the Trojan Horse: An Australian Perspective of Dra-
matic Authorship, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 789, 815 (2009). Salter’s inter-
views with directors repeatedly return to this theme:
Directors . . . suggest that there is a clear distinction between what is
written on the page and what appears on the stage. As a consequence,
some directors believe the notion of the “Romantic playwright” being the
authorial voice of the work is incompatible with theatre creation. Theatre
director Ben Winspear:
[Romantic authorship in theatre is] just not realistic. The theatrical
text is only relevant when it’s spoken and spoken in the context of
the stage. At any other point it’s like an architect’s plans. You know
there wouldn’t be a single building in the world that accurately re-
flects the plans of an architect. You are always pulling out the jack
hammer and shaving off a bit here, and knocking an extra doorway
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either by copyright law or by literary critics.11  For live theater, reproduc-
tive copying is neither the point of the endeavor nor particularly highly
valued.  Francesca Coppa explains that different performances are ways to
learn more about the underlying work as well as to explore the multiple
potential stories that can be told using the same characters and situations:
[I]n theatre, stories are retold all the time. . . . Moreover, there’s no as-
sumption that the first production will be definitive; in theatre, we want
to see your Hamlet and his Hamlet and her Hamlet; to embody the role is
to reinvent it. We also want to see new generations of directors and de-
signers recast the play without regard for authorial intent or historicity,
putting Hamlet into infinite alternative universes.  What if Hamlet was a
graduate student? What if Hamlet had an (entirely ahistorical) Oedipal
complex?  What if Hamlet was a street kid in the Bronx? Hamlet has
been portrayed as an action hero/medieval warrior, the avenging son of a
Japanese CEO, an angry young man, and a university student home on
break.12
Though this is not often recognized, this fluidity is inherent in any
work under modern copyright law.  The intangible “copyrighted work” is,
by definition, distinguishable from the material copies in which it is em-
bodied.13  Thus, the boundaries of the “work” are unfixed until we start
comparing it to other works that might or might not infringe.  In modern
copyright law, copyright owners have a right to control “substantially simi-
lar” copies of their works, and a (partially) separate right to control “de-
rivative works,” which means that their rights extend to other forms, such
as movie versions, sequels, translations, condensations, and so on.14  Every
through there and filling that up with concrete . . . . [T]heatre exists
between the audience and the performers . . . .
Id. at 873. See also Coppa, supra note 8, at 237 (“The script isn’t the final
product in theatre; in fact, one of the questions that theatre theorists have
had to debate is the location of the work of art. Is it in the author’s original
script? Probably not; the original script goes through innumerable changes
in performance and is rarely seen outside of library archives.  The published
script of a theatrical or teleplay is usually a postproduction draft that takes
into account changes that were made during production by actors, directors,
and designers; far from being evidence of a single authorial vision, a pub-
lished play is one of the most collaborative genres in existence.  And most
theatre works never result in a published script at all, so it’s difficult to
argue for text as the central object in a theatrical art experience.”).
11 Michael W. Carroll, Copyright’s Creative Hierarchy in the Performing Arts, 14
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 797, 818 (2012) (“Authors of source works are
not similarly situated to most other authors because their work is not fully
realized until it has been performed.  The law should not give one of these
codependent parties the right to veto the creative aspirations of the
other . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
12 Coppa, supra note 8, at 236.
13 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
14 Id. § 106.
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copyrighted work is therefore like the script for a play: it is a blueprint, but
not just for one particular instantiation.  Rather, the blueprint can have a
potentially infinite series of variations.15  All works are surrounded by
possible derivative and infringing variants, most unrealized.16
However, as copyright’s scope expanded, the conception of a work of
art, paradoxically, hardened.  The West has experienced a long period of
what Fumi Arewa calls the “sacralization” of the work.  For example,
before the classical period, opera performers routinely chose arias that
showcased their own skills, regardless of the opera in which the singers
were performing.  Over time, that ability to alter the role to suit came to
seem bizarre: a failure of the performer to recognize her place.17  The
same sacralization process tended to freeze symphonic music and dramatic
works, making revisions of Shakespeare’s plays to change their endings or
genres — formerly standard — into assaults on the correct order of
things.18  Only one version was “authentic.”  Shakespeare had to be pro-
tected both from the audience (which might want different versions or
happier endings) and from “overbearing actors” whose desire to show off
their own skills threatened the play’s “integrity.”19  Cultural arbiters ad-
monished actors “not to take liberties” with the text.20  This elevation of
the creator of the fixed script/text over the performer, whose performance
was thereby made less significant, is part of the cultural devaluation of
performance.  The body-work of performance — the physical labor of cre-
ating a performance — seems easier to discount than the creative labor of
conceptualizing a work, even though a performance may be the result of
just as much preparation and calculation as a script (and even though cop-
yright formally disavows a labor theory of value).21
15 See Coppa, supra note 8, at 237.
16 Cf. Marvin Carlson, Theatrical Performance: Illustration, Translation, Fulfill-
ment, or Supplement, 37 THEATRE J. 5, 10 (1985) (“A play on stage will
inevitably display material lacking in the written text, quite likely not appar-
ent as lacking until the performance takes place, but then revealed as signif-
icant and necessary. At the same time, the performance, by revealing this
lack, reveals also a potentially infinite series of future performances provid-
ing further supplementation.”).
17 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright
and Musical Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1839-40 (2011).
18 LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, HIGHBROW/LOWBROW: THE EMERGENCE OF CUL-
TURAL HIERARCHY IN AMERICA 72, 138 (1988); see also id. at 146 (for sym-
phonies, “the masterworks of the classic composers were to be performed in
their entirety by highly trained musicians on programs free from the con-
tamination of lesser works or lesser genres, free from the interference of
audience or performer . . . .”).
19 Id. at 72.
20 Id. at 138.
21 For a version of this argument from a venerable source, see Adam Smith:
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Recordings changed what was sacred, but left the sacralization pro-
cess largely intact.  As Jacob Smith explains, “recording allowed for a shift
in the ontological status of music, most dramatically in genres such as rock
and roll, which made the record, not the written score or live performance,
the central work.”22  Performances can now be separated from performers
and exist as artifacts: “With recording one is able to experience, revisit,
and analyze nuances of particular sounds and voices, so that improvised
genres of music such as jazz can be heard and discussed in the same man-
ner as a written score.”23
Audiences came to understand and evaluate performances in relation
to some other fixed instance, whether written or recorded.24  Now, we go
to concerts to see live performances of the recorded songs with which we
are intimately familiar. These performances can then be judged against
their recorded versions in a way that was impossible for previous genera-
tions, creating a new meaning for live, embodied performance.25  Jazz is
The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society is, like
that of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or
realize itself in any permanent subject . . . .  In the same class must be
ranked, some both of the gravest and most important, and some of the
most frivolous professions: churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters
of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers,
&c. . . . Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or
the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very
instant of its production.
2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 45-46 (Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed. 1904).  Thanks to
Wendy Gordon and Joseph Liu for insights on this point.
22 JACOB SMITH, VOCAL TRACKS: PERFORMANCE AND SOUND MEDIA 120
(2008).
23 Id. at 121.
24 See, e.g., Joanna Demers, Melody, Theft, and High Culture, in MODERNISM
AND COPYRIGHT, [ ],[ ] (Paul K. Saint-Amour ed. 2010) (“Lydia Goehr has
shown that Western art music’s work-concept emerged around 1800, along-
side a growing awareness of musical material as property . . . .  Composers
no longer wrote mere pieces but rather works that existed theoretically as a
set of instructions or ‘scores.’  These theoretical works were realized
through performances whose quality was judged on the basis of their fidel-
ity to the originating score as well as to conventions governing music-mak-
ing.  The work-concept was groundbreaking because it distinguished
performances (which could be riddled with mistakes) from works (which
were supposedly independent, permanent, and capable of expressing the in-
effable).  The work-concept, in short, allowed music to escape its grounding
in ephemeral sound and to aspire to what was seen as a superior quality of
the plastic arts: permanence.”) (citations omitted).
25 The distinction isn’t total.  It was always possible for an individual to consider
Sarah Bernhardt’s Hamlet the canonical Hamlet; that judgment was just
more debatable. Cf. Ben Brewster, The Fundamental Reproach (Brecht), 2
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celebrated for its improvisational nature and radio stations play canonical
jazz recordings long after the improvisers are dead.  Elsewhere, some peo-
ple attend showings of The Rocky Horror Picture Show in order to partici-
pate in a live performance whose pleasures stem from its relation back to
the fixed, canonical version.
This conceptual shift toward a single canonical performance as the
embodiment of a work occurred even though fixity was neither historically
a characteristic of books in the early age of print26 nor is it now a require-
ment in the digital age.27 Today, the same technology that allows exact
fidelity also allows George Lucas to reconstruct Star Wars to erase the fact
that, when the film was first shown, Han Solo shot first,28 and allows Ama-
zon to delete copies of George Orwell’s books (and our notes on them)
from our Kindles.29
So why canonize? The static work seems easier to handle, legally
speaking, than a changeable performance.30  “Performances seem ineffa-
ble, and thinking about them induces reverie rather than analysis.”31  In
addition, art critics have been willing to deem performance marginal and
less creative by comparison to standard works of literature and visual art.
CINE-TRACTS 44 (1977) (Brecht “asserted that ‘the theatre’s first advantage
over the film is . . . in the division between play and performance’, and
continued ‘the mechanical reproduction gives everything the character of a
result: unfree and inalterable.’”).
26 ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK: PRINT AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE
MAKING (1998) (arguing that, because of the ways in which books were
printed sheet by sheet and “pirated” by various printers who altered them
in different ways, it was extremely common for different copies and unlikely
that all copies of the “same” book would be identical; the fixity of print was
an ideological effect, not a natural fact).
27 WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE: VISUAL TRUTH IN THE
POST-PHOTOGRAPHIC ERA 52-53 (1992) (digital technology enables a gen-
eral shift from fixity to lack of certainty in the existence of a true original;
each digital image is an instance in a chain, “made to be processed, . . . and
any file is the potential progenitor of an endless sequence of descendants”).
28 Rich Drees, George Lucas and the Not-So-Special Edition of Star Wars, FILM
BUFFONLINE, http://www.filmbuffonline.com/Editorial /EditorialStarWars
.htm (last visited July 29, 2010).
29 Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon
.html.
30 Anne Barron, supra note 7, at 371 (arguing that the division of art into specific
types, as in copyright, makes performance exceedingly difficult to concep-
tualize, in part because theater and related arts cross the boundaries of type
and in part because theater needs an audience to be complete and thus
refuses the self-contained status so vital to copyright’s (and modernism’s)
definition of an artwork).
31 John O. Thompson, Screen Acting and the Commutation Test, in STARDOM:
INDUSTRY OF DESIRE, 183, 183 (Christine Gledhill ed., 1991).
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(This bias is found in high and low culture alike — consider the preference
many rock fans have for singer-songwriters, and the disdain they have for
boy bands and other performing groups.)  Performance is often founded
on interpretation of others’ creativity, as when actors perform an existing
play or singers perform an existing song.32
Moreover, a system oriented towards words has difficulty evaluating
performance elements and may treat them as meaningless or worthless.
Thus, prominent copyright lawyer Nathan Burkan failed to persuade a
court that there was anything protectable in Charlie Chaplin’s perform-
ance, despite (or perhaps because of) his argument that the performance
was so distinctive that it couldn’t be described in words, only portrayed.33
Likewise, copyright law specifically prevents audio performers from claim-
ing rights available to other authors: the sound recording copyright pro-
tects only against mechanical duplication of fixed sounds, not against the
creation of soundalikes copying the performance elements added by a
singer; while this restriction is necessary to make the mechanical license
for musical works effective, it also encodes into law the judgment that cre-
ative elements of musical performance aren’t worth protecting against the
kind of copying that would be actionable as applied to books, scores, and
the like.34
Our difficulty with recognizing the contribution of performance ele-
ments to meaning is also troublesome when it comes to fair use.  In Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose, for example, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence cautioned
that the defense should not be read too broadly, using as an obvious exam-
ple the claim that a rap version of the country hit Achy Breaky Heart
would be (1) hilarious and (2) not a fair use.35 Justice Kennedy was unwill-
ing to acknowledge that performance style alone could change the mean-
ing of a musical work sufficiently to serve as commentary on that work,
even though it is patently obvious that this occurs on a regular basis.
32 See Carroll, supra note 11, at 799 (“Regrettably, copyright law in all countries
takes an elitist approach.  In the thrall, or under the pall, of the ideology of
Romantic authorship, copyright grants the author of the source work a priv-
ileged position and the right to veto a live or recorded performance that
does not suit her taste, unless one of copyright’s limitations or exceptions
applies.”).
33 See PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT WARS 74 (2012) (“Bur-
kan’s larger strategy, however, was to insist that [Charlie] Chaplin was a
unique genius, an ineffable quality that anyone could just see for them-
selves. Chaplin’s genius could not be described or broken down into distinct
elements. In one show of courtroom theatrics, Burkan claimed that a clip
from a Chaplin film would have to be placed in the court’s decision, because
words could not describe him.”) (footnote omitted).
34 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006).  I thank Joe Liu for this point.
35 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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George Plasketes argues that covers routinely provide a new meaning and
message for existing works:
As one of music’s major forms of intertextuality, covers are not only im-
mersed in history, they recognize, recite and reshape the past . . . .  A
cover song invites, if not insists upon, a comparison to the original, . . .
engaging the listener in a historical duet with lyric and lineage. . . .  With
the original framed in forefront or back of our mind, we consider the
conversions and their contrasts . . . .36
Tori Amos, for example, has an entire album of cover songs by men about
women; her renditions are often transformative, most notably when she
covers Eminem’s tale of a jealous husband murdering his wife and child.37
Jimi Hendrix famously reworked The Star-Spangled Banner in a way that
transformed its meaning.  More generally, Sheldon Schiffer has docu-
mented how racial, social, and sexual difference as instantiated by per-
formers can change the meaning of a song.38
36 George Plasketes, Further Re-flections on “The Cover Age”: A Collage and
Chronicle, in PLAY IT AGAIN, supra note 8; at 11, 35-36; see also Greil Mar-
cus, Old Songs in New Skins, in DE CAPO BEST MUSIC WRITING 2000, at
374, 376 (Peter Guarlnick & Douglas Wolk eds., 1999) (“One of the ways
songs survive is that they mutate . . . .  Pop songs are always talked about as
the ‘soundtrack to our lives,’ when all that means is that pop songs are no
mere containers for nostalgia, but lives change and so do soundtracks, even
if they’re made of the same songs.”); Deena Weinstein, Appreciating Cover
Songs: Stereophony, in PLAY IT AGAIN, supra note 8, at 243, 249 (“A cover
can provide a different mood, another emotional tone, and can alter the
meaning of a composition, inverting it or merely providing a new under-
standing of the subject.  And many covers change both mood and mean-
ing . . . .  Goth renditions, for example, tend to infuse a composition with a
sense of weakness or misery.”).  These changed meanings aren’t necessarily
progressive. See David Dante Troutt, I Own Therefore I Am: Copyright,
Personality, and Soul Music in the Digital Commons, 20 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 373, 417 (2010) (discussing major record labels’
practice of producing white covers of African-American performers and
promoting those covers to white audiences).
37 See/hear also Alanis Morissette delivering the Black Eyed Peas’ My Humps in
her distinctive mournful style, creating a contrast that both emphasizes the
banality of the original song and the bathos of Morissette’s own style.
Alanis Morissette, My Humps, YOUTUBE (April 5, 2007), http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=pRmYfVCH2UA.  I am reliably told that Bowling for
Soup’s cover of Britney Spears in the remake of Freaky Friday produces a
similar effect. See generally Plasketes, supra note 36, at 27 (discussing ways
in which cover songs recontextualize the work, making it the performer’s
own).
38 Sheldon Schiffer, The Cover Song as Historiography, Marker of Ideological
Transformation, in PLAY IT AGAIN, supra note 8, at 77, 81 (“Songs ‘in-
tended’ to validate relations between God and its human subjects were sex-
ualized (Sister Rosetta Tharpe’s 1940s Nobody’s Fault But Mine versus Led
Zeppelin’s 1970s).  Songs intended to validate heterosexual romance and
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Similar performance changes affect meaning in nonmusical perform-
ances.  Comedian Tina Fey delivered vice presidential candidate Sarah
Palin’s words verbatim, and, in the performance, made a profoundly effec-
tive parodic point.39 (Not incidentally, it is difficult to imagine anything
other than performance that could have made this point: even playing
footage of Palin’s own interview would not have been as revealing.)
Often, the changes depend on the physicality of the actors, particularly
their apparent race, gender, or sexuality; attempts to change racial or gen-
der casting in plays have been suppressed because of interference with
preferred meaning.40  But there are infinite and incalculable ways that
performance elements can change meaning: for example, setting Waiting
for Godot in a post-apocalyptic bunker has a very different meaning than
setting it in Beckett’s empty room, grounding “the individual’s despair in
an external event that was shared by all.”41
In non-performance situations, where the person making the changes
has the same desire to interpret an existing work through a new lens,
courts have understood that the copyright owner’s very insistence on fix-
ing meaning strengthens the case for fair use.  In the Wind Done Gone
case, Alice Randall’s rewriting of Gone with the Wind to add in discussions
of miscegenation and homosexuality was a factor in favor of transforma-
tiveness, given the Mitchell estate’s unwillingness to accept such
changes.42  But Randall was a writer like Mitchell, not a mere imple-
menter as directors and performers are often considered.  Thus, her fair
use defense was taken seriously in ways that directors’ and performers’
claims for interpretive freedom generally aren’t.
Perhaps a performance-oriented culture will come to see the trans-
formativeness of performance more readily.  In one recent case, the plain-
sexual roles could validate homosexual love or alternative sex roles (Rod
Stewart’s Tonight’s the Night 1970s versus Janet Jackson’s 2000s).  Songs
meant to personify one ethnic or national group could augment another
ethno-national identity (David Bowie’s Changes 1970s versus Seu Jorge’s in
2004) . . . .  The recording star persona, utilizing the cover song to construct
its own identity, by affiliation, alters the beliefs of its listeners.”).
39 Gender pops up in these examples along with race, which is not surprising
given conventional associations between performance, excess emotionalism,
and femininity.
40 See Anthony Tommasini, All-Black Casts for ‘Porgy’? That Ain’t Necessarily
So, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at E1 (cross-racial casting of Porgy and
Bess); Leonard Jacobs, German ‘Godot’ a No Go: Beckett Publisher
Quashes Cross-Gender Production, BACK STAGE, Feb. 6, 2004, at 62 (cross-
gender casting of Waiting for Godot); Carroll, supra note 11, at 808 (discuss-
ing the content restrictions that are standard in performing licenses).
41 MARTIN GARBUS WITH  STANLEY COHEN, TOUGH TALK: HOW I FOUGHT FOR
WRITERS, COMICS, BIGOTS, AND THE AMERICAN WAY 192 (1998).
42 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
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tiff, Keeling, created a parody version of the film Point Break, Point Break
LIVE!  The parody stemmed from recreating the storyline of the original
film — about an FBI agent who goes undercover to take down a group of
surf-loving bank robbers — using amusingly unrealistic props and staging,
and putting an unrehearsed audience member in the key role of the FBI
agent, played in the film by notoriously blank actor Keanu Reeves.  The
lawsuit began when the defendants, after a dispute with the plaintiff,
started staging their own version of Point Break LIVE!  They obtained a
license from the owners of the rights to Point Break, but none from Keel-
ing, and argued that she had no valid copyright because her version was an
unauthorized infringing work.  The court, and a subsequent jury, found
that she had established that her version was fair use.  Therefore it had its
own independent copyright, which the defendants infringed.43
Here, performance works as commentary by heightening elements of
the original. The props and the use of the unrehearsed audience member
reading from cue cards “really catches the essential rawness of Keanu
Reeves’ acting style.”44  Tongue in cheek repetition produces a disruptive
effect: the “wonderfully iconic quotes from the movie” combined with
their theatrical presentation created “a night of live theater that rivals any-
thing by Samuel Beckett in terms of pure excitement and energy.”45  Like
an annoying younger sibling repeating anything the older one says, the
copying is itself the change that fair use seeks.
But the Point Break LIVE! decision produced barely any written
findings.  The court didn’t explain its conclusions on the transformative-
ness of performance, and so the case may not make much of a precedential
dent.  It wouldn’t be surprising if the court simply found it very difficult to
43 Keeling v. New Rock Theater Prods., LLC, No. 10-cv-09345 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,
2013).
44 ABOUT POINT BREAK LIVE, http://www.pointbreaklivela.com/About.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2013); see also Eriq Gardner, Playwright of ‘Point Break’
Parody Wins $250K Trial Verdict (Dec. 20, 2012, 4:45 PM PST), http://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/playwright-point-break-parody-wins-405930
(“‘The trial turned on Ms. Keeling’s testimony of how she made the serious
into jokes and how the amount she used from the film was justified,’ says
Ethan Jacobs, an attorney at Vinson & Elkins, who represented her.  By
way of example, Jacobs says Keeling showed that by having unrehearsed
audience members pretending to make a movie, ‘She captured the effect of
Keanu Reeves’ performance in the film like he was reading off of cue
cards.’”).
45 Id.; see also Jacob Coakley, Yo, Johnny! See You in the Next Life! Point Break
LIVE! is the Ultimate Rush, http://www.lasvegasweekly.com/news/2008/oct/
09/yo-johnny-see-you-next-life/ (Oct 9, 2008) (“This is a raucous, hysterical
night of theater that revels in the stupidity of the movie and the absurd
cleverness of adapting it live onstage in front of you.”).
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explain in conventional legal language what was so transformative about
repetition with irony and bad line readings.
If we don’t have a good vocabulary for explaining how meaningful
performance is, it should come as no surprise that we don’t even know
how to give credit to performers, as the following section discusses.
II. PERFORMANCE AS AUTHORSHIP
A. Background: Dividing the Dancer from the Dance
As noted above, the legal system has difficulty in assessing perform-
ance as a contributor to the value or meaning of a work.46  It is even diffi-
cult to tell what creative elements audiovisual copyrights protect in many
cases: the camerawork or the underlying activities depicted.  In success-
fully arguing for protection for virtually all audiovisual works, proponents
focused on the characteristics of a recorded performance that make it a
record — the producer’s choice of microphone, the cinematographer’s
choice of angle or focus.47  As Anne Barron has explained with respect to
46 See, e.g., Troutt, supra note 36, at 396 (“[T]he secondary status given to per-
formers and performance under copyright law has been a critical lever in
determining the scope of economic benefit and artistic recognition under
music copyright law.”); Sunny Noh, Better Late Than Never: The Legal The-
oretical Reasons Supporting the Performance Rights Act of 2009, 6 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 83-84 (2009). And yet performance can readily make
all the difference. Playwrights who refuse to allow cross-racial or cross-gen-
der casting, among others, are pretty clear that the written instructions do
not control the meaning of a performed work.  See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy
This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 570 & nn. 162-163 (2004) (citing instances); cf.
id. at 569-70 (discussing ways of performing music that change its meaning).
Because of performance’s connections to the body, it is unsurprising that
treatment of performance has had a profoundly disparate racial impact as
well. See, e.g., Troutt, supra note 36, at 404 (“[W]hether they were compos-
ers and performers or only performers, the majority of musicians then and
now received most of their income as artists from performance.  The fact
that the 1909 Act continued to regard most performance as . . . unprotected
‘reading’ of protectable ‘writing,’ severely disadvantaged many musicians
for generations, especially black artists who were often rendered unpro-
tected performers after the theft of their compositions by unscrupulous in-
termediaries.”) (footnotes omitted).
47 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.09[F] (“When a football game is
being covered by four television cameras, with a director guiding the activi-
ties of the four cameramen and choosing which of their electronic images
are sent to the public and in which order, there is no doubt that what the
cameramen and the director are doing constitutes authorship.”); Nat’l Bas-
ketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997); cf. Eva E.
Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity,
76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1513-17 (2011) (arguing that courts regularly pro-
tect photographs based on the characteristics that make them, physically,
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UK law, copyright law has therefore oscillated between reducing film to a
physical medium — a record of technical choices — and ignoring film’s
specific characteristics, such as the way that editing creates narrative
meaning, by claiming to protect the dramatic events recorded by the me-
dium separate from editing.48
The formal justification for providing copyright to film as film is that
creative, authorial activity takes place in selecting camera angles and simi-
lar choices.49  Thus, the Zapruder film was an incredibly valuable copy-
righted work, whose creative choices consisted of Zapruder’s choice to
bring his camera, choice (limited by multiple constraints) of place to stand,
choice to focus on the Kennedy car, and so on.  Zapruder wasn’t responsi-
ble for the things that happened on the film, but he owned his recording of
them.  But the film isn’t valuable because of the camera angles.  It’s valua-
ble because it’s a record of what happened.  The situation is similar, if less
historically significant, with many valuable works such as sports competi-
tions, for which broadcast rights are worth billions of dollars.  Copyright’s
incentives are really working on the underlying, unprotectable games, not
the camera angles.50  Still, the participants — performers — aren’t under-
stood to be authors.
When we can’t be sure what the protected elements of a work should
be, we also have difficulty figuring out who to credit for it. Thus, contro-
versies over performance works, including plays and movies, make up a
large share of disputes over joint authorship in the U.S. system.51 Because
joint authors share equally in the rights to a work no matter how unequal
photographs); BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS
FOR A MARXIST THEORY OF LAW (1977) (arguing that the needs of capital-
ism led courts to shift from considering photographs as mere mechanical
reproductions to regarding them as productions of an author; in film, the
producer was likewise deemed an author).
48 Barron, supra note 7, at 193.
49 See supra note 3.
50 Compare Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805
F.2d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 1986) (baseball players’ performances in playing
baseball were copyrightable, thus preempting right of publicity claims based
on televised performances), with Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 846-47
(unscripted sports performances were not copyrightable); 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.09 [F] (underlying athletic events themselves are
“not subject to copyright protection[,]” even if fixed).
51 See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998); Childress v. Taylor, 945
F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that an actress who helped playwright with
play was not a joint author because of lack of intent); Mary LaFrance, Au-
thorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of
Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 228-29 (2001) (attacking the Childress
approach to determining joint authorship and arguing that it has not been
grounded in either law or policy by any subsequent court).
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their contributions, and because each one can license it nonexclusively
without the consent of the other authors, courts have preferred to award
authorship to a single person.  This preference, however, often leads to
dismissiveness regarding the real creative contributions of others involved
in bringing a work of performance to its audience.52
Claims of copyright in stage directions have provided one place where
tensions between creators have moved to the legal arena.53  The law has
difficulty conceptualizing stage directions because they are both dynamic
— arising out of the interaction of many people — and dependent on the
underlying play: they are at least close relatives to derivative works of the
original script.  Indeed, one might go beyond stage directions and claim
that individual actors’ performances are also derivative works — works
that transform, recast or adapt the script to the medium of performance
and that as a whole represent the addition of new creative material (the
stuff of authorship).54  This is an awkward conclusion, however, because
the derivative works right is a separate right from the public performance
right, and a standard license to perform a play only grants the latter.
Perhaps copyright law has been able to ignore stage performers’ crea-
tivity because we expect their compensation to come from direct payment
for the services of their bodies, not from the royalties to which other crea-
tive types are accustomed.55  We understand the producer of a movie to be
52 Carroll, supra note 11, at 804 (discussing the “mutual dependence” of the au-
thor of a text destined for performance on the people who bring it to life,
and vice versa; “Both the authors and the other creative parties contribute
individual creativity to the collective performance.  A range of creative indi-
viduals sits between the author of the source work and the performer, such
as directors, producers, dramaturges, and cinematographers.”).
53 See, e.g., David Leichtman, Note, Most Unhappy Collaborators: An Argument
Against the Recognition of Property Ownership in Stage Directions, 20
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 683 (1996); Jennifer J. Maxwell, Note, Making a
Federal Case for Copyrighting Stage Directions: Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Pro-
ductions, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 393 (2008); Talia Yellin,
New Directions for Copyright: The Property Rights of Stage Directors, 24
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 317 (2001); Margit Livingston, Inspiration or
Imitation: Copyright Protection for Stage Directions, 50 B.C. L. REV. 427
(2009).
54 Rob Kasunic’s research has suggested that many copyright registrations for
“pantomimes” historically were similar to stage directions.  He speculates
that actors could argue that their movements qualified as copyrightable
pantomimes.  Private correspondence.
55 Cf. Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy and the Power of Perform-
ance and Brands, VOLOKH.COM (Oct. 18, 2012, 7:35 AM), http://www.
volokh.com/2012/10/18/the-knockoff-economy-and-the-power-of-perform
ance-and-brands, (suggesting that being able to charge for performance as-
pects of an experience diminishes the need for copyright’s economic
incentives).
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interested in — motivated by — the right to circulate copies, and thus we
generally treat movies as artifacts that exist only because of the incentives
copyright provides.  Actors, as well as theatrical directors, or anyone else
engaged in making bodies move in space, seem to have different and lesser
interests.56
The lesser cultural value given to performance-oriented creativity
pushes courts and critics towards perceiving single authorship.  There are
also factors pulling in that direction, especially for large-scale works such
as films.  For economic reasons, control is generally centralized in a film
company as the owner of a “work made for hire.”  And on a theoretical
level, treating a film director as the unitary source of intent and meaning
has been an irresistible temptation for many film critics. It’s just so much
simpler than looking at all the contributors, and it’s often useful to believe
that there is a single master mind to whom a unitary plan can be
attributed.57
But we also recognize performers as artists, which is to say as cre-
ators.  The ideology of creativity as the foundation of authorship thus sug-
gests that (some) performers should count as authors.58  It’s true that
individual authorship only matters in the U.S. in the absence of contracts
with the potential authorial candidates specifying that the film is a work
for hire for the purposes of copyright law.  A work for hire is legally au-
thored by the commissioning party.  Such contracts are routinely signed
with the traditionally recognized author-candidates involved in creating a
film.59  Contracts are less consistent with respect to non-lead performers,
56 Cf. Matthew Rimmer, Heretic: Copyright Law and Dramatic Works, 2 QUEEN-
SLAND U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 131, 142 (2002) (arguing that there is a double
standard in the treatment of producers as between plays and movies, so that
“[t]he producer of a play is denied copyright protection because of a belief
that a dramatic work is just concerned with live performance” while “[t]he
producer of a film receives copyright protection in order to facilitate the
capital investment that is required to produce and market such a work to
mass audience”).
57 See Salter, supra note 10, at 838.
58 Carroll, supra note 11, at 805-06 (“An actor, a dancer, and a musician each
face a range of creative choices when deciding how to perform a role or a
piece  of music.  These creative choices can be fixed in a tangible medium
simply by recording the performance.  On copyright’s first principles, these
creative choices are sufficiently original to qualify the performer as an au-
thor of her performance.  This view does not enjoy full acceptance, how-
ever. . . .  Courts treat musicians, producers, and some sound engineers as
authors of their recorded performances.  Nevertheless, courts recognize
only some collaborators in theatrical productions as authors, and actors and
dancers usually are not treated as authors.”) (footnotes omitted).
59 See Jonathan Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets 13
(2012), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=211
8918 (explaining that Hollywood film companies treat writers differently
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makeup artists, set designers and so on, since their contributions are not
generally thought to rise to the level of authorship in the first place.60  If
they’re not authors, there’s no reason to call their contributions “works
made for hire,” and perhaps some reason not to do so, in order to
strengthen the argument that no one expects such people to be authors in
the not uncommon case in which a contract is incomplete or not fully
executed.61
Authorship is still important even if we expect it routinely to be trans-
ferred by contract.  Among other things, a work is only copyrightable
when it’s fixed “by or under the authority of the author,”62 so we first
need to know who the author is to know whether the fixation requirement
has been met.  Also, authors have special rights with respect to copy-
righted works, compared to non-authors who contributed to those same
works.  While the author of a novel owns the copyright, and can even re-
capture it thirty-five years after transferring it to a publisher as a matter of
statutory right, the editor of the novel owns nothing, no matter how much
she contributed to the novel’s value and success.  The same rule applies to
anyone who contributes material not rising to the status of “authorship” to
any work — and for films, there are a lot of such people.
In order to protect against the threat of hundreds of people claiming
partial ownership of each film or play, courts have interpreted the concept
than directors and actors because of their understanding of copyright law,
requiring written contracts with writers in order to ensure ownership of the
writers’ copyright); but cf. id. at 11 (noting that studios do appear to insist
that directors and principal actors transfer any intellectual property rights in
writing even if the rest of the contract isn’t formalized).
60 See, e.g., Britton Payne, Copyright Your Life: The Implications of Works Made
for Hire and Termination of Transfer in Non-Scripted Entertainment, 15 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 172 (2007) (“Because of the nature of some
kinds of reality television and other new media making use of the techno-
logical democratization of entertainment, the contracts granting copyright
to producers often do not explicitly identify a performer as contributing
work made for hire.”); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Pro-
cess: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1999, 2018 (2011) (“Contributors often do not adequately
consider their intellectual property rights beforehand, or even if they do,
rarely pay enough attention to clearly define their respective rights by con-
tract.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on
Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1159, 1165,
1169-82 (2000) (noting pervasive failure to contract with sufficient specific-
ity about copyright ownership).
61 As Barnett points out, Hollywood is full of non-repeat players and potentially
large one-time gains that make attempts to impose holdup costs on film
companies more likely.  Barnett, supra note 59, at 22.
62 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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of joint authorship extremely narrowly.63  The 1976 Copyright Act defines
a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the inten-
tion that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.”64  So the intention to merge contributions may
be present, but you first have to be an author before that intention mat-
ters. And how do you get to be an author?  Initially, courts look for a
“master mind” in control of the entire production.65 Since that’s inconsis-
tent with the very idea of joint authorship, the courts then hold that each
author must have the intent to share authorship specifically, not just the
intent to merge their contributions into a unified whole, in order to be-
come a joint author.66  Courts also often state that true authors have final
decisionmaking authority, again in inherent tension with the concept of
joint authorship.67
But this test is problematically self-referential: how do we decide who
gets to have the relevant intent?  What if, for example, contributor 1
thinks of herself and contributor 2 as authors, but contributor 2 sees him-
self as the sole author?   Contributor 2’s self-centeredness is likely to be a
63 Barron, supra note 7, at 206.  Anne Barron attributes this result to the needs of
capitalism overriding the theory of creativity supposedly adopted by copy-
right law. Id. at 191 (“[C]opyright law in the UK has had no difficulty what-
soever in reconciling the ideology of individual artistic expression with the
commodity form of the subject: quite simply, the former has yielded un-
questioningly to the latter when the relations of production have so re-
quired. This is nowhere more evident than in relation to photographers and
filmmakers.”).
64 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
65 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (“author” is best
defined as “the person to whom the work owes its origin and who superin-
tended the whole work, the ‘master mind.’ . . . [For a film, this] would gener-
ally limit authorship to someone at the top of the screen credits, sometimes
the producer, sometimes the director, possibly the star, or the screenwriter
— someone who has artistic control.”) (citation omitted).
66 Id. at 1233-34 (“[A] person claiming to be an author of a joint work must
prove that both parties intended each other to be joint authors.”).
67 If joint authors disagree, one of them must generally prevail, and yet they
could still easily be joint authors as long as they both admit their interde-
pendence. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories”: Narrative’s Im-
plications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 60 (2001) (identifying bias against joint authorship in Aal-
muhammed: “[T]he court is fixated on a definition of ‘authorship’ which
embodies a single creative entity. . . .  The notion that a movie could be the
product of many creative authors whose contributions are blended into the
final product is completely foreign to the court’s sensibilities. This bias is
underscored by the court’s obsession with the exercise of ‘control’ as a key
element in determining authorship.”).
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legal advantage.68  As long as he looks sufficiently author-like, his dis-
counting of contributor 1’s contributions will help him be deemed the sole
author.  Some scholars have begun to argue for use of accession, a doc-
trine borrowed from real property, to resolve related questions about
ownership of derivative and transformative works.69  But to know who
owns an improvement or contribution through accession, one must first
know who owned the core piece of property.  Multi-contributor produc-
tions can often resemble the soup in the fable of “Stone Soup,” in which a
sharp operator convinces a village that he can make soup out of stones —
as long as each of the villagers contributes a little bit of meat, vegetables,
spices, etc.  The resulting dish is delicious, and the stones are a but-for
cause of the soup, and yet it seems odd at best to say that the stranger with
the stones is the true owner and proprietor of the soup.
Along with intent, courts also look at customary roles to disqualify
people as authors — editors are not authors;70 playwrights are authors but
68 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Book Review, The Author as Steward “For
Limited Times”: The Idea of Authorship in Copyright, 88 B.U. L. REV. 685,
695 (2008) (noting that the standard favors the “dominant” author over an
equally contributing but “non-dominant” author).
69 See David Fagundes, Efficient Theft: Copyright & the Accession Insight
(2011), available at https: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3 /papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1949545; Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property
and Copyright, 56 VILL. L. REV. 251, 292 (2011) (addressing accession with
the presupposition that a work already has an identified author who has
planned the work).
70 As one court put it:
[A] writer frequently works with an editor who makes numerous useful
revisions to the first draft, some of which will consist of additions of copy-
rightable expression. Both intend their contributions to be merged into
inseparable parts of a unitary whole, yet very few editors and even fewer
writers would expect the editor to be accorded the status of joint author,
enjoying an undivided half interest in the copyright in the published
work. Similarly, research assistants may on occasion contribute to an au-
thor some protectable expression or merely a sufficiently original selec-
tion of factual material as would be entitled to a copyright, yet not be
entitled to be regarded as a joint author of the work in which the contrib-
uted material appears. What distinguishes the writer-editor relationship
and the writer-researcher relationship from the true joint author relation-
ship is the lack of intent of both participants in the venture to regard
themselves as joint authors.
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). But see Mary La-
France, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving
the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 223 (2001) (criticizing the
“unexamined assumption” that Congress wouldn’t have wanted this
“parade of horribles” and the further assumption that an intention test is
required to prevent it).
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dramaturgs and actors are not;71 and so on.  The result of the current test
is that portions of a work added in rehearsal, or in the middle of produc-
tion, when the lived experience of creating a work counsels changes in its
form, are unlikely to result in any authorship rights for the people who are
taking a script from the page to its instantiation in a performance.  Copy-
right thus contributes to freezing notions of authorship and discounting
the contributions of people who play vital roles in the form and content of
the final work but who didn’t write scripts for it.
Giving authorship to a single master mind responsible for making a
film neatly avoids the practical problems of recognizing multiple creative
contributions.  But, as Barron points out, the cost of disregarding those
contributions is a significant one: it seems to threaten copyright’s legiti-
macy, since copyright is supposedly justified by the need to protect and
incentivize creativity.72  The Patent and Trademark Office, for example,
whose name indicates its outsider relation to copyright law, claimed in
support of a treaty expanding copyright obligations that, “[u]nder U.S.
law, actors and musicians are considered to be ‘authors’ of their perform-
ances providing them with copyright rights.”73  Yet this is not the consen-
sus among copyright experts, especially as to non-lead singers and actors.
When it comes to sound recordings, indeed, copyright discourse is
highly conflicted.74  Representatives of the music industry touted the au-
thorial contributions of recording engineers (as part of a larger strategy to
argue that sound recordings generally constitute “works for hire” not sub-
ject to termination rights).75  Yet recording a live concert without the per-
71 See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (dramaturg); Chil-
dress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (actor).
72 Barron, supra note 7, at 206-07 (pointing out that granting copyright to pro-
ducers overprotects, in that it gives rights in non-expressive works like se-
curity videos, and underprotects, in that it ignores the “elements of film
form that constitute a film as an aesthetic object”).
73 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, WIPO AVP TREATY –
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 2 (2012).
74 Nimmer recognizes the substantial uncertainty surrounding authorship of stan-
dard commercial sound recordings. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
3, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii] (suggesting that, if featured artists were authors and
could therefore terminate transfers to record companies, “[e]qually entitled
to terminate would be backup musicians, sound engineers, producers, and
others” (citing Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters’ testimony that
“[t]here could easily be a dozen or more potential co-authors of a single
sound recording”)) (citation omitted).
75 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570 (“The
copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not always,
involve ‘authorship’ both on the part of the performers whose performance
is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible for setting up
the recording session, capturing and electronically processing the sounds,
and compiling and editing them to make the final sound recording . . . .  As
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former’s permission is understood to be “without the consent of the
author,”76 which assumes that it’s the performer, not the recording engi-
neer, who’s the author, in that case the sole author (since there was obvi-
ously no intention to create a jointly authored work).  Authorship moves
around as needed to meet the needs of the industry.
If authorlike contributions can easily disappear into a larger work
without authorship, presumptive statutory categories might provide a bet-
ter guide to joint authorship than the current system.  American law could
create such categories for audiovisual works in the same way that Euro-
pean countries list default classes of authors for films.  The U.S. already
distinguishes between lead performers and backup or session performers
for certain purposes in sound recordings, and could explicitly do so for
authorship purposes as well.77  If anti-fragmentation considerations are
primary, the law could identify specific roles eligible for joint authorship
treatment (and perhaps allow others to contract into joint authorship),
making explicit judgments about manageability rather than implicit judg-
ments about value.  While drawing lines may seem difficult, it is a difficulty
already encountered by current law, only filtered through ideas of author-
ship and intent;78 performers might benefit from making such determina-
tions more openly and categorically.
in the case of motion pictures, the bill does not fix the authorship, or the
resulting ownership of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the
employment relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.”);
Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights In Sound Recordings,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 383 (2002).
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
77 But see La France, supra note 73, at 405 n.110 (“In theory, Congress could
designate by statute some finite class of creative collaborators . . . .  [I]t is
difficult to imagine a statutory scheme that could conclusively predetermine
the owners of termination rights in every possible type of creative collabo-
ration that results in a sound recording.  Even statutory categories such as
‘featured’ and ‘nonfeatured’ musicians, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(g), 1006(b)(1)
(2006), are open to much interpretation . . . .  It is, therefore, doubtful
whether any of these theoretical solutions offers much promise in prac-
tice.”).  LaFrance’s criticism is well taken, but we may well need to decide
between rough justice or none.  It may make sense to make baseline as-
sumptions for pure administrability purposes.
78 Cf. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii] (noting objection
that determining “key contributors” to sound recordings would be too diffi-
cult, and the rejoinder that most contributors didn’t qualify as authors in the
first place because “side musicians, backup singers and engineers, are hired
to work on a song with the contractual understanding through standard in-
dustry agreements that their contributions are made without claims of au-
thorship”) (quoting Michael Greene of the National Academy of Recording
Arts & Sciences).
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As is often the case, tensions in the law become more apparent in
edge cases. The next sections discuss the rise of performers’ copyright
claims, asserted as a way to get around barriers to other (more appropri-
ate) causes of action such as defamation and invasion of privacy. These
cases, in which the performers are often sympathetic figures, threaten cop-
yright’s self-image as simultaneous protector of creativity and protector of
economic incentives.
B. Case Study: Innocence of Muslims and the Innocence of Actors
Recently, authorship in performance was glancingly part of a signifi-
cant public controversy: the Innocence of Muslims video disparaging Islam
that sparked violent protests around the world.79  One of the actors in the
film, Cindy Lee Garcia, alleged without contradiction that she was duped
into participating by the filmmaker, Nakoula.  Garcia alleged that she was
paid to perform in a film called Desert Warrior, “an adventure film set in
ancient times.”  She was allegedly unaware of any religious or sexual con-
tent to the film (although her lines did involve her protest against mar-
rying her thirteen-year-old daughter to a man of over fifty).  She alleged
that most of her scenes involved only “playing with the actress who por-
trayed her ‘daughter.’”  After filming, her dialogue was overdubbed and
changed so that she appeared to accuse the prophet Mohammed of being a
child molester.80
Garcia attempted to exploit the gaps in our current concept of per-
formance by arguing that all the ordinary rules for imputing her consent
and non-author status were voided by the filmmaker’s fraud.81  And it
79 Reactions to Innocence of Muslims, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Reactions_to_Innocence_of_Muslims (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
80 Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula ¶ 4, No. 2:12-cv-08315-MWF-VBK (C.D. Cal.
filed Oct. 4, 2012).
81 Garcia allegedly signed a release, which if valid appears to be a form adopted
without much knowledge by anyone involved, and the form itself is incom-
plete, another sign of unsophistication on all sides.  (Garcia claims that the
release is a forgery.  Michael Joseph Gross, Disaster Movie, VANITY FAIR
(Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-inno-
cence-of-muslims  (“Garcia’s suit includes expert testimony from a forensic
analyst who worked on the case of the Zodiac Killer, asserting that Garcia’s
handwriting and signatures on the releases provided by Nakoula are
forged.”)).  The “Assignment of Rights” provision in the “cast deal memo”
assigns “all rights necessary for the development, production and exploita-
tion of the Motion Picture, whether denominated copyrights, performance
rights, or publicity rights,” then separately states that all writing for the film
will constitute “works made for hire.”  Garcia v. Nakoula, Declaration of
Mark Basseley Youssef ¶ 4.  The two provisions in the cast release were
probably supposed to be alternatives, not to work in tandem, and only the
latter provides for the “work for hire” status that is standard in film.
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does seem that fraud should usually invalidate the contractual logics courts
ordinarily use to resolve performers’ authorship claims.  However, copy-
right law wouldn’t work very well if Garcia owned a separate copyright in
her performance. But that conclusion requires us to explicitly detach au-
thorship from creativity, at least for certain cultural artifacts, and admit
that’s what has happened.
Garcia sued a number of entities for producing and disseminating the
film.  Among her targets was Google, on whose YouTube site the film
“trailer” appeared.  Her initial lawsuit, in state court, asserted only inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and similar claims.  Google has im-
munity under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act for such causes
of action, but the CDA does not cover intellectual property claims.82
Thus, in her subsequent federal lawsuit she offered the theory that she was
an author and not just a victim of a fraud.  She alleged that Google wrong-
fully ignored her takedown notice83 and was therefore liable for copyright
infringement.
An earlier case offers an instructive comparison. In Morrill v. Smash-
ing Pumpkins,84 Jonathan Morrill filmed Video Marked, a music video,
showing Billy Corgan’s then-band The Marked.  When Corgan’s new, suc-
cessful band The Smashing Pumpkins released a video that included short
clips from Video Marked, Morrill sued, claiming sole ownership of the mu-
sic video.  Corgan’s defense was that he was a joint author, and the court
agreed.  Corgan’s songwriting and performance were copyrightable contri-
butions to the overall work.  Corgan controlled the performance elements,
while Morrill’s filming, editing and producing “helped shape and present”
The release also speaks of a grant of “permission” to “record” and “use” Gar-
cia’s performance, and states that Garcia won’t bring any claims, “including
but not limited to, those grounded upon invasion of privacy, rights of pub-
licity or other civil rights, or for any other reason.” Id., Exh. 1.  However,
this language is insufficient to fully transfer a copyright interest, if any ex-
ists, because the Copyright Act bars any agreement that surrenders a natu-
ral person’s right to terminate a copyright transfer after thirty-five years.
See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). Cf. Payne, supra note 60, at 189 (arguing that, if
a performance is independently copyrightable, then a transfer of a per-
former’s rights would be fully terminable, because the larger work in which
it is embedded is unlikely to be a derivative work of the performance).  Sec-
tion 203 allows continued exploitation of derivative works post-termination,
but the transferor can stop continued use of mere reproductions.  I think
Payne is wrong, because the termination right is best read to prevent termi-
nation in these circumstances, but the existence of the argument shows why
a producer would want a work for hire agreement from anyone in the posi-
tion of an author.
82 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
83 17 id. § 512.
84 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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the music but would have been meaningless without the music.  Corgan
and his band had “sole control” over the musical work and its perform-
ance — they were the relevant master mind(s).  In addition, Morrill de-
scribed the video as a work he created “with” Corgan and the band, a
“collaboration,” evidencing intent to be a joint author.  Finally, the work’s
appeal to the audience came both from the visual aspects of the work and
the musical/performance elements, and the share of each in its success
couldn’t be disentangled from the other.  Thus, the court concluded, Cor-
gan was a joint author.85
Garcia would seem to satisfy this version of the “master mind” test —
interviews with many people involved with the film suggest that the direc-
tor gave no direction, and performers played with their performances and
line readings at will;86 and of course without her performance, there’d be a
meaningless blank space in the film regardless of editing and camera oper-
ation.  Likewise, whatever appeal The Innocence of Muslims has seems to
come from the combination of the various contributions.  As a unitary
work, it wasn’t designed to be separable.  Only “intent to be a joint au-
thor” stands between Garcia and joint ownership.
Given current doctrine’s joint authorship intent requirement, how-
ever, Garcia’s position as victim of a fraud makes her authorship claim
untenable.  The very facts that indicate that she was defrauded, and that
we ought not to take her initial consent to perform in (what she thought
was) the film as true consent to its creation and dissemination, plead her
out of authorship status.87  In order to establish her blamelessness, Garcia
pled that the filmmaker, Nakoula, manipulated her.  She did not receive a
85 Cf. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d
663, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1986) (telecasts of baseball games are protectable be-
cause of “camera angles, types of shots, the use of instant replays and split
screens,” and similar choices, but baseball players’ contributions were also
copyrightable). Baltimore Orioles’ conclusion about the copyrightability of
the underlying game has been heavily criticized. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 3, § 2.09[F].  Subsequent cases have largely ignored the possibil-
ity of joint authorship and the critical question of intent. See, e.g., Big
Fights, Inc. v. Ficara, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1377, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that filmmakers, not boxers, own copyright to movies of fights while quot-
ing Baltimore Orioles for the proposition that both the contributions of the
filmmakers and the contributions of the performers are copyrightable).
86 See Gross, supra note 81.
87 Nimmer has argued that a material breach by the hiring party should allow
recission of a work-for-hire agreement, thus allowing a person who would
otherwise be an author to regain that status; this would imply similar results
for fraud.  However, the treatise notes that this position has not been fol-
lowed in the US, particularly where there is an agreement with a non-em-
ployee to contribute to a work for hire.  1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3,
§ 5.03[E].
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full script from him but was only given “specific pages”88; he “held himself
out as the writer and producer,” “managed all aspects of production, and
as far as [Garcia] observed, was in charge of all aspects of the produc-
tion.”89  Indeed, Nakoula allegedly “used her as a puppet.”90  This is the
language of Nakoula as master mind: the singular author who can accept
or reject contributions from others without losing his status as singular
author.91  Thus, even accepting her claim that her contract transferred no
copyright rights — and additionally that her contract was void based on
fraud — that would still not give her a copyright interest in the film under
current doctrine.  She wasn’t a joint author because she wasn’t an author.
Garcia argued that the film was not a joint work because there was no
meeting of the minds, given Nakoula’s fraud.92  But that’s a much worse
fact for Garcia than for Google: since she was simply an actor in a larger
production, the parties’ failure to form a mutual intent to create a joint
work means that authorship stays with the “master mind,” in this case
clearly Nakoula, who told Garcia that she was “innocent” of involvement
with the final work.  Regardless of Garcia’s intent, there is no reason to
believe that Nakoula ever had any intent of sharing authorship in the cop-
yright sense.93  Later, Nakoula allegedly disavowed any ownership interest
in the film.94  But that didn’t logically mean that Garcia became the au-
thor.  At most, a lacuna may have appeared, a blank space — or perhaps
Nakoula dedicated the work to the public domain as part of whatever his
mission is.
The Ninth Circuit, in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, had previously held that
“a person claiming to be an author of a joint work must prove that both
parties intended each other to be joint authors.”95   Garcia argued that this
meant that the burden was not on her to prove ownership, because she
88 Id. ¶ 28; see also Declaration of Cindy Lou Garcia ¶ 10.
89 Complaint, supra note 80, ¶ 5.
90 Id. ¶ 8; see also Gross, supra note 81 (“During filming, as in the auditions,
everyone associated with the production got the sense that Sam Bacile [aka
Nakoula] was in charge. . . .  The film’s titular director was Alan Roberts,
whose long list of B-movie credits includes soft-core films such as Young
Lady Chatterley. . . .  He was generally perceived to be Nakoula’s lackey,
and he kept his distance from most people on the set.”).
91 Almuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (“an author ‘superintend[s] the work . . . ‘by
putting the persons in position, and arranging the place where people are to
be . . .’”).
92 Garcia v. Nakoula, Ex parte Application for TRO, at 4.
93 See Garcia Declaration ¶ 13 (stating that Nakoula claimed sole responsibility
for the film, and averring “I never harbored any intent, jointly with
[Nakoula] or with anyone else . . . to commit my performance to Innocence
of Muslims”).
94 Garcia Ex parte Application, at 13 n.9.
95 202 F.3d 1227, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2000).
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was claiming to be the sole copyright owner.96  This argument is revealing
because it’s so odd: Garcia argued that, as a performer who appeared for
five seconds in a much longer film,97 she should be considered the sole
author as long as the director wasn’t intervening in the dispute.  The very
implausiblity of the claim highlights how the current joint authorship stan-
dard inherently presumes that there’s one real or core author who can be
identified and whose intent can then be assessed.98  Only from that base-
line can the Ninth Circuit’s standard sensibly be applied.  The standard is
useless if, for example, two people each claim sole authorship of a work
they produced together and we can’t tell which is the “real” author.
In response to the point that she had pled herself into the position of
non-author, Garcia argued that the position “that minor actors simply do
not make creative contributions because they are reading a script or do
not have marquee billing [ ] denigrates the work of actors.”99  But
Google’s argument — following the case law — was not about creativity: it
was about authorship.100  The case law functions to detach participants’
creativity from any copyright interest in a work where intent to become
joint authors was absent on the part of the person who seems to count as
the “master mind.”  Creativity abounds in an audiovisual work, but it only
finds legal attachment points in a few places.  Again, this poses difficulties
for the theoretical coherence of a law that supposedly grants rights be-
cause of the existence of creativity in a work, but those appear to be toler-
able in the interests of consolidating ownership.
Garcia’s initial ownership argument — disavowing joint ownership
but claiming copyright — implied that, in the absence of an intent to share
authorship, both parties (or, here, all parties, since there were multiple
actors involved) owned undivided copyrights in something.  But what?  It
couldn’t be in the work as a whole, since if they all owned undivided copy-
96 Garcia, Ex parte Application, at 18.
97 Garcia v. Nakoula, Google Opposition, at 13.
98 See also Reinsdorf v. Skechers, U.S.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28293, at *9
(C.D Cal. Mar. 9, 2011) (parties’ inconsistent intentions could indicate lack
of intent to form a joint work; what remains is to decide who the singular
author then was).
99 Garcia Reply at 1.
100 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Everyone
from the producer and director to casting director, costumer, hairstylist and
‘best boy’ gets listed in the movie credits because all of their creative contri-
butions really do matter.  It is striking in Malcolm X how much the person
who controlled the hue of the lighting contributed, yet no one would use the
word ‘author’ to denote that individual’s relationship to the movie. . . .  A
creative contribution does not suffice to establish authorship of the
movie.”).
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rights in the work as a whole, they’d be joint authors; that’s the definition
of joint authorship.
As a workaround to this problem, Garcia claimed sole ownership of
her performance as fixed (or deformed) in the final film, alleging that she
owned copyright in “the dramatic performance she delivered.”101  Thus,
she claimed sole authorship of her contribution even absent an authorship
interest in the final film.  She cited cases holding that actors’ performances
fixed on film were within the subject matter of copyright,102 and argued
that Aalmuhammed recognized that contributions not rising to the level of
joint authorship could still be independently copyrightable as separate
works.103
But there is a gap between “within the subject matter” of copyright
and “copyrightable,”104 and that gap here is authorship.  The key move in
this argument is whether, as Google insisted, the film had to be treated as
a unitary work for these purposes.105  A “dramatic performance,” insepa-
rable from the audiovisual work of which it is a part, has little claim to a
separate copyright status.  Even Garcia’s registration application reflects
this difficulty.  She used the form for registering an audiovisual work (a
category recognized by the Copyright Office) but then stated that she
sought to register a performance (a category not recognized as such).106
Google also, unsurprisingly, appealed to policy considerations in
favor of conceptualizing the work at issue as the film rather than as Gar-
cia’s performance: Google decried the
impenetrable thicket of conflicting rights that would arise if each creative
contributor (i.e., actors, director, producer, cameraman, cinematogra-
pher, costume designer, make-up artist, etc.) could hold an independent
101 Garcia Complaint ¶ 10, 11.
102 TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R.
2007); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d  645, 650 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that “individual performances” in a film were copyrightable, and thus that
actors’ right of publicity claims were preempted by federal copyright law).
103 Garcia Reply at 5-6, citing Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1231, 1232 (“We recog-
nize that a contributor of an expression may be deemed the ‘author’ of that
expression for purposes of determining whether it is independently
copyrightable.”).
104 As indicated by preemption cases, which generally find that right of publicity
claims are preempted when they’re based solely on the use of a copyrighted
work, in which the person portrayed consented to appear, at least when the
work isn’t used as part of an ad for an unrelated product.  Actors’ perform-
ances are in that sense within the scope of copyright even though the actors
aren’t copyright owners. See Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 650; cf. Selby v. New
Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (scope and protec-
tion are not synonymous).
105 Google Opposition, at 14.
106 Garcia Complaint Exh. B.
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and exclusive copyright interest in his or her contribution to a movie. The
copyright held by the film’s author would be rendered meaningless, as he
or she could not possibly exercise the exclusive rights afforded under the
Copyright Act without trampling on the rights of other contributors.107
This fundamentally utilitarian consideration is why, if the master
mind does not intend to share authorship, voluntary contribution of copy-
rightable material to a unitary work that can’t be disaggregated into the
separate contributions of individuals constitutes a surrender of authorship,
which means a surrender of ownership.108  This situation is not unique to
performers—software created by multiple contributors is another com-
mon example—but the general inability of performers to access the bene-
fits of authorship shows how copyright’s antifragmentation inclinations
can trump creativity-as-authorship.  Contracts could change this rule in
performer-friendly ways, but rarely do.  (Even European copyright law,
which is generally more protective of the claims of individuals than Ameri-
can law, has scant regard for performers in this regard: default rights-own-
ers in films, where specified, are people such as producers, directors,
screenwriters, cinematographers, and composers — not performers.109)
The court’s denial of Garcia’s motion for a preliminary injunction
broke no new ground.  Because Garcia didn’t and couldn’t claim author-
ship or co-authorship of the entire film, “by operation of law Garcia neces-
sarily (if impliedly) would have granted the Film’s author a license to
distribute her performance as a contribution incorporated into the indivisi-
107 Google Opposition at 14-15. See also Note, Recent Cases: Copyright – Joint-
Authorship – Second Circuit Holds That Dramaturge’s Contributions to the
Musical Rent did not Establish Joint Authorship with Playwright-Composer,
112 HARV. L. REV. 964, 967 (1999) (noting that if a work can be carved up
into multiple works, a contributor “could hold a collaborative work hostage,
or demand its dismemberment”).
108 Cf. Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 123 (2002) (justifying essentially the present regime with a
contractarian argument based on implicit consent).
109 PASCAL KAMINA, FILM COPYRIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 151-52 (2002)
(arguing that a performer would never count as an author, as actors only
perform works and do not create them or contribute to them substantially
enough to rise to the level of authors); see also Adriane Porcin, Of Guilds
and Men: Copyright Workarounds in the Cinematographic Industry, 35 HAS-
TINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (in French law, the director, the script-
writer, the author of any adaptation, the dialogue writer, and the composer
are considered authors of an audiovisual work by default; EC law provides
that the director of an audiovisual work is an author, but does not specify
anyone else who must be considered an author).  While European law man-
dates certain protections for non-owners, it distinguishes “authors” from
“interpreters,” excluding performers from the definition of authors. See
Porcin, supra, at 10.
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ble whole of the Film.”110  Yet it is not clear why Garcia’s fairly persuasive
fraud claim has no purchase against the implied license.111  Moreover,
while Ninth Circuit precedent means that Garcia’s license is apparently
irrevocable,112 in other circuits an implied license may be revocable at will,
which would allow similar claims.113
The policy considerations behind Google’s arguments are compelling,
but would be more persuasive if offered without the fiction of a master
mind who, Svengali-like (or at least Hitchcock-like), controlled everything
in the film. If we are honest that, at least with respect to large-scale works,
we are interested in economic incentives and in the smooth operation of
copyright rights and limitations, rather than in rewarding creativity as
such, we can deny multiple authorship claims without calling performers
uncreative.  Despite her sympathetic moral status as against Nakoula, Gar-
cia’s remedy should lie outside of copyright.
C. Other Performers’ Authorship Claims and Their Weaknesses
Garcia is not the only performer to have made similar authorship
claims.114  Legal scholars have suggested that unwilling participants in “re-
venge porn,” whose images are uploaded onto public websites without
their consent, should claim copyright in still and moving pictures as “au-
thors” of their own performances.  As Derek Bambauer puts it:
For revenge porn, I think there is a defensible position that the subject –
the victim – of the image or video is at least a joint author. . . .  Because of
the subject – not because of the lighting, the use of unusual color or an-
gle, the excellent development of the print, or any other contribution by
the photographer.  Put it this way: imagine that the victim is replaced by a
110 Garcia, No. CV 12-08315-MWF (VBKx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012), at 3.
111 Perhaps the underlying idea is that fraud can’t void a license to create a copy-
righted work.  Garcia knew that she was contributing to the production of a
unitary work, even if she was deceived about the nature of that work.  Her
remedy would then be in contract, not in copyright.  Conceptually, one
might liken this to the difference between covenants in copyright licenses
(breach of which makes a licensee liable in contract, but not for copyright
infringement) and conditions (breach of which makes a licensee into a copy-
right infringer). See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th
Cir. 2010); cf. Christopher M. Newman, A License is Not a “Contract Not to
Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Li-
censes, 98 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2013).
112 Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748, 757 (9th Cir. 2008); Rano v.
Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1993).
113 See Walthal v. Rusk, 1998 WL 42469 (N.D. Ill. Jan 28, 1998).
114 See also, e.g., Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134, 1139-40 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (two martial arts experts and a professional dancer who modeled for
characters to be used in the Mortal Kombat arcade games were not authors,
given the game makers’ control and the relative insubstantiality of the
plaintiffs’ contribution to the game).
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dummy, or Felix the Cat. No one is even going to glance at the photo:
there’s nothing expressive or original about it. I think that means that a
victim, and her attorney, can often take a legally defensible position that
she is an author of the photo.115
Bambauer’s concern for the victims of these reprehensible sites is under-
standable, but distorting copyright law is not the right solution.  Change
the subject: Lee Harvey Oswald was not an author of the Zapruder film,
though he created the subject matter.116
Entertainer Hulk Hogan recently claimed copyright in a sex tape in
which he was featured, though it’s unclear whether he claimed to be the
author or whether he secured the copyright as part of a settlement with
the person who recorded and released the film without his consent.117  In
his initial argument, his attorneys claimed that the film itself was made
without his knowledge, which would pose some difficulty for a claim that
he was an author.118  A court denied his request for a preliminary injunc-
tion against dissemination of the film, questioning his later-added copy-
right claims as inconsistent with his disavowal of knowledge, and
emphasized the First Amendment interests in reporting news.119  Other
celebrities who’ve had sex tapes released have also claimed copyright
rights by transfer of ownership from the author (the filmmaker), but au-
thorship-by-performance may represent a new legal frontier for disap-
pointed performers.120
115 Derek Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright, INFO/LAW (Jan.
25, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2013/01/25/beating-revenge-
porn-with-copyright/.
116 In a different context, Nimmer criticizes the idea that contributing commercial
value to a work is an indicator of the copyrightability of that contribution.  1
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.09[F] n.78 (“[I]n a reductio ad ab-
surdum . . ., one could maintain that the fans, popcorn vendors, and every-
one else whose image is broadcast have participated in the creation of a
copyrightable work. Their mere appearance on the television screen vouch-
safes the ‘commercial value’ of their appearance . . . .”).
117 See Jose´ Patin˜o Girona, In Legal Twist, Hulk Hogan Might Copyright Sex
Tape, TBO.COM (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www2.tbo.com/news/breaking-news/
2012/nov/08/in-legal-twist-hulk-hogan-might-copyright-sex-tape-ar-559467.
118 Id.; see also Oren J. Warshavsky, Hulkamania Is Running Wild: Let the Battle
Begin (in Court, LEXOLOGY.COM (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=739ce022-6912-4c29-a354-ea51048a613d.  Given that
Hogan settled with the initial taper, his copyright claim might well be the
result of a transfer as part of the settlement.
119 Bollea v. Gawker Media, No. 12-cv-02348 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2012) (question-
ing the validity of the plaintiff’s claimed copyright, though resting its deci-
sion on fair use and plaintiff’s own lack of interest in exploiting the tape).
120 See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (granting summary judgment against sale of celebrity sex tape on cop-
yright grounds); cf. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 1998 WL
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The distinction between initial ownership and transfer makes a differ-
ence because of the divergent way the law treats authors and people claim-
ing invasion of privacy.  Non-authors have a much harder time suppressing
dissemination of works about them than authors do.  Courts may react
badly when the copyright has been obtained by transfer in order to sup-
press the work.  Howard Hughes, for example, purchased the copyrights in
articles about him in and then sued a biography quoting those articles; the
court found fair use in significant part because of Hughes’ censorial mo-
tive.121  By contrast, if the copyright was owned by the performer in the
first instance, she could easily be seen as exercising an ordinary right of
control over timing and release,122 or even a right to suppress the work
entirely.123
Expanding performers’ ownership claims by giving them pieces of a
larger work is therefore not an optimal way to recognize the creative value
they provide.  Many commentators have proposed solving problems of
joint authorship by allocating interests proportionally, rather than
equally.124  While these rules might do more equity as between contribu-
tors to works, they would create significant problems for third parties,
such as intermediaries or fair users.  In a world in which any contributor
might be at least a partial author, after a final judicial determination, how
should YouTube react to a takedown notice from a contributor, especially
if YouTube isn’t in a position to confirm that the work was posted by an-
other contributor?  (Given that an exclusive right is required to send a
882848 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (granting summary judgment against cop-
yright owner in favor of news program that aired short clips of the same sex
tape).
121 Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
But see Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., 2012 WL 1592229 (S.D.N.Y. May 3,
2012) (where film showed subject repeatedly hitting another person, court
dismissed right of publicity claim by subject, but refused to dismiss his copy-
right claim because he’d obtained copyright by transfer).  As Eric Goldman
points out, allowing copyright to suppress truthful negative information is
an abuse of its purpose, but it’s more likely to work for audiovisual content
because of the veridical nature of audiovisuals — the truth can be reported
in many noninfringing verbal ways, but a picture or video often needs to be
shown to be fully understood.  Eric Goldman, The Dangerous Meme That
Won’t Go Away: Using Copyright Assignments to Suppress Unwanted Con-
tent—Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & L. BLOG (May
14, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/05/the_meme_that_w.
htm.
122 Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).
123 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990).
124 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 60, at 1220; Kwall, supra note 67, at 57-58;
Mandel, supra note 60, at 2020.
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DMCA takedown notice or to sue for infringement, recognizing more
joint authorship would affect these practices as well.)
How should a user who believes her work is a fair use evaluate a
threat from the same contributor?  Or, if the contributor claims a separate
copyright in her contribution, as Garcia did, how should we think about
fair use?  The “amount used” factor might change substantially if works
can be carved into multiple copyrightable performances, and a use might
“transform” the meaning of the overall work but leave a contributor’s per-
formance untouched/uncommented-on, which would seem to mean that
the use wouldn’t be transformative as to that contributor’s interest.  While
all of these problems could be worked through with a new set of rules
(likely adding further epicycles of copyright complications), I pose them to
make clear that the current authorship/ownership rules don’t just favor big
corporations, though they of course also do that.
As Professor Justin Hughes has explained, the practice of recognizing
“microworks” — little bits of larger works, each with their own copyrights
— is harmful to the overall function of the copyright system.125  The per-
former isn’t the only one who might exploit such arguments to suppress
fair use. If a film’s copyright owner successfully obtained the performer’s
rights, it could make the same arguments against fair uses of short clips.
While some courts might resist such gamesmanship, Hughes has docu-
mented that many courts are willing to accept this kind of slicing and dic-
ing in order to expand copyright owners’ rights.126
Indeed, another reason to doubt that tweaks to authorship doctrine
would do much good for most voluntary performers is that, at least for
well-advised producers, contracts would change to ensure that no individ-
ual contributor is ever an author of an audiovisual work, but always a par-
ticipant in the creation of a work for hire.127  The people most affected by
125 Justin Hughes, Size Matters (Or Should) In Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 575 (2005).
126 See id. at 576-79.
127 Even Nakoula tried that, however badly.  Compare the consequences of New
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001), which found that newspapers
lacked rights to use freelancers’ articles in computer databases.  The result
seems to have been that contracts going forward granted the newspapers
full electronic rights, with no increase in payment. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton,
Who Owns ‘The First Rough Draft of History?’: Reconsidering Copyright in
News, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 521, 524 n.11 (2004) (“[F]reelance contracts
now typically include a ‘work made for hire’ clause or other provisions
granting publishers the right to use purchased freelance articles without
meaningful restriction or further compensation.”); Maureen O’Rourke,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2003) (“[L]arge publishers . . . have been requiring
freelancers to sign work for hire agreements or to license all of their rights
under so-called ‘all-rights agreements’ . . . all often for no compensation
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\60-2\CPY210.txt unknown Seq: 33  7-MAY-13 13:06
Performance Anxiety 1033
a change in the law would be amateurs who didn’t have Hollywood-style
contracts — the Innocence of Muslims situation — and people who were
filmed without their consent (such as participants in brawls that show up
on YouTube), or who didn’t think copyright would matter (such as people
who make sex tapes but expect that their lovers will stay true).  For those
people — the least likely to be well advised, and relatedly the least likely
to be incentivized by copyright to create — courts would still have to as-
sess what level of contribution would suffice to make them “authors.”
Would deliberately planned movement count? Causal effect on the event
ultimately recorded?  Only a very strong right grounded in mere physical
presence in the film, which would itself tend to diminish the role of crea-
tivity in justifying the right, would help in those situations.
Other rights would do a better job than copyright here: victims of
revenge porn should have an invasion of privacy remedy, whereas for vol-
untary performers who make significant contributions to a work we might
consider statutory rights to compensation (rather than control), as already
exist in some instances for music in the U.S. and more broadly in
Europe.128
III. PERFORMANCE AS INFRINGEMENT
Infringement inquiries also raise difficult questions about how to
compare distinct media, particularly when one medium includes a per-
formance element and the other doesn’t.  We should be highly skeptical of
most such claims.  The technical features of texts and performances are
different, and they produce different effects on the audience, or the same
effects in different ways.129  For example, written text has the ability to
present characters’ internal states of being; first person narrative has dif-
above what publishers paid under licenses customarily understood by the
industry to grant rights only to one-time publication in North America.”).
128 As Catherine Fisk has argued, non-copyright regimes such as labor law also
have a role to play in securing compensation, attribution, and other benefits
as against employers. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk, The Modern Author at Work
on Madison Avenue, in MODERNISM AND COPYRIGHT 173 (Paul K. Saint-
Amour ed., 2010) (arguing that, given work for hire doctrine, labor relations
have meant more to determining authorship and authors’ rights than formal
copyright law); Catherine Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property
Rights in Markets for Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild
of America, 1938–2000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMPLOY. & LAB. L. 215 (2011)
(arguing that unions can support privately negotiated intellectual property
rights suitable to particular industries).
129 Cf. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F. 2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990)
(“The raw communicative power of dance was noted by the French poet
Stephane Mallarme, who declared that the dancer ‘writing with her body . . .
suggests things which the written work could express only in several
paragraphs of dialogue or descriptive prose.’”).
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ferent qualities than limited third person or omniscient third.  By contrast,
audiovisual works produce identification (or distance) with techniques
based on external presentation, such as closeups and reaction shots.130
These techniques make use of the physical (or at least visual) presence of
performers: embodiment changes how stories are told.  Narration in film
and television is carried out not by a speaker but “by the camera (the
angles, duration, and sequencing of what it sees) and not uncommonly by
music.”131
Consider the technique of the repeated flashback: because of the way
in which we experience visuals and audio, repetition that would be intoler-
able in a written text is a standard storytelling technique for television and
movies.  Indeed, movies and shows can be built around repeated se-
quences — Groundhog Day is the most well-known example, though
there are many others.132  Relatedly, many people happily listen to the
same sound recordings over and over, but reading the same book multiple
times in a short period is a task generally reserved for those with small
children to placate.  Whether the repetition includes variation or not,
something about the performance experience changes the value and plea-
sure of that repetition.  The medium isn’t entirely the message, but per-
formed works regularly bring new meanings with them in every
performance, as Francesca Coppa noted with respect to Hamlet.  The bot-
tom line is that although performance elements often drop out of our con-
sideration of creativity in audiovisual works in authorship disputes, they
are still vital to audiovisual works.
To say that a novel is substantially similar to a film with the same
general plot, and thus infringing, therefore requires a very high level of
abstraction away from the affordances of each medium and a focus on
narrative.  But narrative theorists point out that story (what happens) is
distinct from narrative (how what happens is communicated to the audi-
130 Y’Barbo argues that the expression in a book comes from its prose and literary
devices, including internal monologue, while film’s expression is visual and
depends on actors, juxtaposition of images (such as the Kuleshov effect,
whereby sequencing shots leads viewers to attribute emotions to actors as if
they were reacting to the previous shot), and other forms of editing.  Writ-
ten texts communicate the passage of time differently than film, leading to
different pacing.  Douglas Y’Barbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial
Appeal: Adapting Novels to Film and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS
REV. 299, 356-62 (1998).
131 H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 19 (2d
ed. 2008).
132 See Groundhog Day Loop, TVTROPES.COM, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki
.php/Main/GroundhogDayLoop (listing examples) (last visited Mar. 30,
2013).
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ence).133  Consider a recent review of the film adaptation of Jack Ker-
ouac’s On the Road, which deems the movie itself not good as a movie, but
“a pretty interesting work of literary criticism,” because “[s]ome things
just feel different when they are thrust visibly in front of you rather than
filtered through the ramshackle prose of Jack Kerouac.”  Some of Ker-
ouac’s most well-known lines, when delivered by actors, are transformed:
[While we hear one famous line, the actors] . . . are walking bouncily
down an alleyway, jumping in puddles and generally making bumptious
asses of themselves. Which is pretty much what Sal, in the book, says
they’re doing as he shares that thought. But somehow, when reading it,
you forget he’s watching a couple of twentysomethings yell half-baked
philosophy at each other on a noisy city night. Watching them on screen,
it occurs to you: The Beat generation was just a bunch of guys.134
The tale has changed in the visual, embodied telling.  But it’s a copyright
truism that plots in themselves are not protected.135  If what is protected is
how the story is told, and changing a medium involves inherent changes in
that mechanism, then how could a film ever infringe a book, or vice
versa?136
A number of theorists express skepticism that there can be anything
like a true adaptation, from the perspective of artistic crticism, of a book
into a film.137  Yet it has seemed important to copyright theorists, such as
133 Id.
134 David Haglund, On the Road: Not a Great Movie, But an Interesting Work of
Literary Criticism, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2012, 7:32 PM ET), http://www.slate.
com/articles/arts/movies/2012/12/on_the_road_the_movie_reviewed.html.
135 Y’Barbo, supra note 130.
136 See id. at 335-36 (“[A]esthetic appeal, which is what copyright law is ostensibly
designed to protect, is fragile.  Paint eyebrows on the Mona Lisa, affix arms
to the Venus de Milo, or add a plot to a Jane Austen novel, and you may
end up with a work whose difference in aesthetic appeal, compared with the
original, is far out of proportion to the actual modification. . . . Clueless
undeniably retains many of [the features of Jane Austen’s Emma], most no-
tably the theme, plot, style, and basic sequence of events. However, many
are reproduced in the movie in painstaking detail. It impacts the viewer as a
truly different work, with a different aesthetic appeal.”) (footnotes
omitted).
137 Id.; GEORGE BLUESTONE, NOVELS INTO FILM, at  viii, 5, 23, 31 (1968)
(“changes are inevitable the moment one abandons the linguistic for the
visual medium,” particularly since film can imply the content of thoughts
but can’t show them directly; film shifts focus from thought and character to
external action and plot).  Echoing the earlier disussion of authorship, Blue-
stone also argues that film and literature are inherently different because
film must be produced collaboratively, while an individual author can target
smaller and more idiosyncratic audiences. Id. at 47-48, 58. See also Sey-
mour Chatman, What Novels Can Do That Films Can’t (and Vice Versa),
reprinted in FILM THEORY AND CRITICISM: INTRODUCTORY READINGS 445
(Leo Braudy & Marshal Cohen eds., 6th ed. 2004).
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Melville Nimmer, to insist that it must be possible for a film to infringe a
book, so much so that Nimmer was willing to dispense with the general
rule that infringement must be judged from the perspective of an ordinary
observer (who is, after all, the consumer who might substitute one work
for the other).138  He therefore called for literary analysis to discover in-
fringing similarity.  This appears to be a mistake of kind, since applying
literary analysis to film is a bit like applying color theory to cooking — it
might tell you something, but it probably won’t reveal the most important
information.  The hegemony of the word, that is, led Nimmer to ignore the
study of the special features of film, which at least arguably would allow us
to figure out whether the protectable expression of a novel had been trans-
lated into an audiovisual mode (just as we could determine whether an
English novel had been translated into French).139  The good news is that
courts have generally been able to reject infringement claims predicated
on mere plot similarity, recognizing that film’s narrative techniques gener-
ally involve completely different kinds of expression than written texts.140
Of course, film infringement cases often appear to be strike suits, in
which a writer- plaintiff believes the defendant-filmmaker has copied ele-
ments that are far from unique.   Courts thus are rarely forced to confront
the role of performance elements in substantial similarity head-on.  In
other circumstances, some courts have been willing to hold that a still im-
age can infringe a performance, and vice versa. In Horgan v. MacMillan,
Inc.,141 the Second Circuit suggested that photographs of a ballet could, by
the power of imagination, contain more than what was depicted and com-
municate performance elements, including the copyright-protected chore-
ography.142  More recently, another case identified potential substantial
similarity between a music video and a still photograph because “both
138 Melville B. Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1125,
1137-38 (1951).
139 See Cameron Hutchison, Adapting Novel into Film 15-18 (2012), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2117556.
140 See, e.g., Braddock v. Jolie, No. 12-055883 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013), slip op. at
11 (“It is difficult to compare the dialogue of the two works because [the
novel] Slamanje Duse, a written work, depicts much more of the characters’
inner thoughts and monologues than is possible on film.  Nevertheless, in
Slamanje Duse, the characters’ thoughts and conversations are verbose and
analytical, while the dialogue in [the film] Blood and Honey is short, urgent,
and sparse.”); see also Y’Barbo, supra note 130 (summarizing cases).
141 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d. Cir. 1986).
142 Id. at 163 (“A snapshot of a single moment in a dance sequence may communi-
cate a great deal. It may, for example, capture a gesture, the composition of
the dancers’ bodies or the placement of the dancers on the stage. . . .  A
photograph may also convey to the viewer’s imagination the moments
before and after the split second recorded . . . .”).
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works share the frantic and surreal mood of women dominating men in a
hyper-saturated, claustrophobic domestic space.”143
By contrast, another court found substantial similarity between a
photo and a video unlikely because video is “a wholly dissimilar and dy-
namic medium, in which camera angles, lighting, and focus are changing at
a rate of 29.4 frames per second.”144  The courts differ in their emphasis
on the importance of movement to the overall expressiveness of the per-
formed work, and also — explicitly in Horgan — in how much weight they
give to the viewer’s own ability to imagine movement from looking at a
still photo.145  This latter consideration should not count in favor of in-
fringement, residing as it does in the audience and not in the works.
Likewise, in a recent videogame infringement case, the court rea-
soned that infringement had to be evaluated in the context of the experi-
ence of gameplay rather than simply looking at screenshots: “It is as
difficult to compare two video games by looking at a few screen shots and
reading written descriptions of game play as it is to compare two movies
by looking at posters and reading excerpts of screenplays.”146  These latter
cases are better reasoned.  They attend to the actual works and the ways
that different media make different meanings.  Explicit attention to narra-
tive techniques, distinct from subject matter, “mood,” and other consider-
ations, could aid courts in identifying when performance elements matter.
Problems determining infringement can also occur when performance
is the way a work is communicated to a factfinder, even though the work
itself is not a work of performance.  Professor Jamie Lund’s empirical
work on music infringement cases provides further reason to be skeptical
about infringement judgments when performance elements may influence
perceptions even as factfinders lack the vocabulary to explain those per-
ceptions, or even lack awareness that the performance elements matter.
Lund demonstrates that when mock jurors are asked to assess the similar-
ity of two musical works using standard instructions given to actual juries,
they give enormous significance to the performance elements of the sound
recording.147  Her controlled experiments showed that performance style
143 LaChapelle v. Fenty, 2011 WL 2947007, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011).
144 Gordon v. McGinley, 2011 WL 3648606, at *6 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2011).
145 789 F.2d at 162 (holding that a viewer of one photo would intuitively under-
stand the movements that must have occurred before and after the photo
was taken, and that one familiar with the underlying ballet would recognize
even more of the choreography from the still photo).
146 See Spry Fox, LLC v. Lolapps, Inc., No. C12-147RAJ, order at 11 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 18, 2012).
147 Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music
Composition Copyright Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 175
(2011) (“[P]laying sound recordings for jurors invites jurors to compare the
wrong thing — the similarity of the performances, rather than the similarity
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can make two very distinct musical works sound similar, or two very simi-
lar musical works sound different.  These jurors are performing the wrong
task, legally, but their failure to follow instructions is understandable given
the actual effects of performance on our experience of a written text or
score.148  Lund’s results suggest that performance matters most when the
works are less similar and least when the musical works are nearly identi-
cal.  This means juries are far more likely to produce false positives —
mistaken findings of infringement — than false negatives — mistaken
findings of no infringement — when they try to understand musical works
through performances.149
Lund’s work also sheds light on the controversial Newton v. Diamond
decision, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the Beastie Boys didn’t in-
fringe a musical work when they sampled a short portion of it, given that
they had a license to sample the corresponding sound recording.150  The
composer’s specific way of playing his score, using a technique known as
overblowing, was part of the licensed sound recording, not the unlicensed
musical work, and thus couldn’t be considered as part of the infringement
inquiry.151  This reasoning can be criticized for discounting elements of
musical works that can’t be or at least aren’t represented in standard nota-
tion.152  But the court was presented with a system in which there are two
works embodied in every piece of recorded music, and it’s understandable
that the court allocated the performance elements to the sound record-
of the compositions. . . .  [W]hen given a jury instruction on substantial simi-
larity, 86.4% of participants who heard the songs performed similarly . . .
said that the songs were substantially similar—a significant majority. Par-
ticipants who heard the songs performed differently went the exact opposite
direction with 84.8% of participants finding that the songs were not sub-
stantially similar.  These results suggest potential for pervasive unpredict-
ability in the application of the law.”).
148 Id. at 139-40 (“The jurors are being asked to look beyond the performance as
expressed in the recording, and focus on the underlying musical ideas em-
bodied in the recording. Yet playing an audio recording invites the juror to
make the wrong comparison by comparing the sound recordings rather than
the compositional elements underlying each recording. . . .  Playing sound
recordings to juries in a Composition Copyright case . . . creates an unavoid-
able risk that the jury will reach the wrong conclusion.”)
149 Lund, supra note 147, at 152.
150 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2004).
151 Id. at 1193-94 (the infringement analysis could consider only compositional
elements, not elements “unique to Newton’s performance,” and the court
had to filter out the licensed elements of the sound recording).
152 Newton’s own expert stated that “[T]he copyrighted score of ‘Choir’, as is the
custom in scores written in the jazz tradition, does not contain indications
for all of the musical subtleties that it is assumed the performer-composer
of the work will make in the work’s performance. The function of the score
is more mnemonic in intention than prescriptive.” Id. at 1194.
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ing.153  If performance elements were part of the musical work, then the
statutory license for covers could become much more complicated.  The
statutory license explicitly allows the performer to modify a composition
to suit his or her style, but not to alter the “fundamental character or mel-
ody” of the work.154  This provision reflects specific Western norms about
what musical works are, but it also gives cover artists greater certainty
about what they can do.  If the rule were otherwise, a performer incapable
of Newton’s overblowing technique might not be allowed to make a cover,
despite the statutory license.
Newton-type problems are only going to increase in intensity as West-
ern music shifts further away from written scores.  Infringement claims
may routinely involve scores reconstructed after the fact, and thus poten-
tially shaped to seem as similar as possible to the accused work.155  More
generally, careful consideration of performance elements in infringement
claims may require courts to go beyond the terms with which they are
familiar — plot and melody primary among them — and consider narra-
tive techniques, rhythm, and other features that may affect similarity
judgments.
These difficulties suggest that courts should be skeptical about per-
formance-based or cross-genre infringement, where verbatim copying is
not at issue and factfinders are likely to have trouble identifying the con-
tributions of performance elements to an accused work.
VI. CONCLUSION
It’s difficult to regulate properly without being able to define the reg-
ulated object.  This is a persistent problem with performed works, whose
boundaries and even whose authors are often ill-defined.  Outdated con-
cepts of creativity focused on sole authors, wholly unsuited to most works
of performance, and unclear ideas about the protectable aspects of audio-
visual works help give copyright its reputation for unpredictability and liti-
gation risk.  This situation benefits very few people.  Although formalistic
solutions have obvious costs and inherent arbitrariness at the edges, it is
worth considering default categories of protected authors and presump-
153 Given Professor Lund’s results, the dissent’s willingness to accept that “a rea-
sonable listener would recognize the sampled segment even if it were per-
formed by the featured flautist of a middle school orchestra” may be
overconfident. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1196 (Graber, J., dissenting).
154 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
155 See Lund, supra note 147, at 143 (“Commentators have argued that because
music is increasingly composed using audio recording equipment without
ever being written down, the scope of Composition Copyright should reflect
the distinctive elements of a song as embodied by the recording.”) (footnote
omitted).
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tions against cross-genre infringement.  Manageability, at this point in our
copyright history, may be more beneficial than a regime that claims to
protect every instance of creativity in any form — especially when that
promise is so often unrealized.
